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The  current  consensus  in  macroeconomics,  as  represented  by  the  New  Neoclassical 
Synthesis, is to work within frameworks that combine intertemporal optimization, imperfect 
competition and sticky prices. We contrast this “NNS triangle” with a model in the spirit of 
Wicksell  and  Keynes  that  sets  the  focus  on  interest-rate  misalignments  as  problems  of 
intertemporal  coordination  of  consumption  and  production  plans  in  imperfect  capital 
markets.  We  show  that, with  minimal deviations  from the standard perfect  competition 
model, a model structure can be derived that looks similar to the NNS triangle, but yields 
substantially different conclusions with regard to the dynamics of inflation and output gaps 
and to the design of the appropriate rule for monetary policy. 
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1  Introduction 
 
If anyone is to blame for the awkwardness of the title of this paper, it should be Olivier 
Blanchard. Looking back on the 20th Century, Blanchard (2000) raised the question: “What 
do we know about macroeconomics that Wicksell and Fisher did not?” His answer was: “… 
a lot”, stressing that much progress has been made in modelling short-run fluctuations of 
aggregate  output  as  effects  of  “imperfections”,  i.e.  as  results  of  “deviations  from  the 
standard perfect competition model”.
1 In another prominent review, Blanchard (1997, p. 
290)  observed  that  almost  all  macroeconomists  now  work  within  a  framework  that 
combines three ingredients: intertemporal optimization, imperfect competition and sticky 
prices. This combination characterizes the current consensus view that is generally labelled 
as the New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS), or the NNS triangle.  
  The NNS is epitomized by Michael Woodford’s Interest and Prices (2003a), a book 
that explores the properties and welfare implications of monetary policy in the confines of 
the  standard  IS-AS-MP  framework,  where  aggregate  demand  (IS)  is  derived  from  the 
representative household’s intertemporal utility maximization, and aggregate supply (AS) is 
expressed in terms of a New Keynesian Phillips curve, based on imperfect competition and 
price  rigidities.  The  model  is  closed  by  a  reaction  function  of  monetary  policy  (MP), 
typically a Taylor rule. Woodford (2003a, ch. 4) describes the model as “neo-Wicksellian”, 
since the IS relation nests the real interest rate associated with potential output and the 
resulting (possibly zero) inflation rate – the “natural rate of interest” in Wicksell’s diction. 
Accounting for stochastic changes of this rate that follow from shocks to technology and 
preferences, the evolution of the economy over time is represented as a dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) process. As a consequence of sticky prices, any gap between 
the market real interest rate (the nominal rate minus expected inflation) and the natural rate 
generates  gaps in output and inflation with respect to their optimal values. These gaps, 
which entail welfare losses, can be reduced by  appropriately designed interest-feedback 
rules on which the central bank operates.  
  This apparatus is clearly reminiscent of Knut Wicksell’s Interest and Prices (1898a). 
Referring  to  Wicksell  and  his  followers  Friedrich  A.  Hayek,  Erik  Lindahl  and  Gunnar 
Myrdal, Woodford (2003a, p. 5) claims “to resurrect a view that was influential among 
monetary economists prior to the Keynesian revolution.” Moreover, by setting the focus on 
output  effects  of  false  positions of  the  market  rate  of  interest,  his  version  of  the  NNS 
appears  to  bring  a  common  theme  of  Wicksellian  and  Keynesian  theories  back  to  the 
forefront of modern macroeconomics. 
  However, Wicksell and his followers, as well as Keynes, did not work within the NNS 
triangle. They normally used the assumption of “free competition”. The stickiness of prices 
and  wages  played,  at  most,  a  subordinate  role  in  their  explanations  of  macroeconomic 
fluctuations. Their key “deviation from the standard perfect competition model” was an 
imperfection  of  the  price  mechanism  in  the  capital  market,  not  in  the  goods  or  labour 
markets.  Even  though  they  differed  in  their  conceptual  frameworks,  both  Wicksell  and 
Keynes set the focus on the causes and consequences of misalignments of the market rate of 
                                                 
1  For a similar history of 20th Century macroeconomics see Woodford (1999). 3 
interest with the rate, at which the plans of real investors (business firms) and financial 
investors (savers, wealth-holders) would be fully coordinated.
2 Intertemporal disequilibrium 
mattered to Wicksell and Keynes, not because of quantity rationing, but because, as long as 
the market real rate of interest is at the “wrong level”, the economy will be driven away 
from its intertemporal-equilibrium path in a cumulative process of changes in prices and/or 
output at which capital and goods markets clear.
3 They also shared the view that price and 
wage flexibility would not per se eliminate the effects of wrong interest rates nor induce 
their correction. Describing the “individual experiment” of optimal household planning, as 
in the NNS, was therefore not considered sufficient to determine the time paths of output 
and inflation. The “market experiment” – i.e. the relative speeds and sizes of output and 
price  adjustments,  when  intertemporal  equilibrium  is  disturbed  by  interest-rate 
misalignments – requires explicit analysis of the resulting shifts in the budget constraints.
4 
Therefore,  by  way  of  contrast  with  the  NNS  triangle  of  intertemporal  optimization, 
imperfect  competition  and  sticky  prices,  a  “Wicksell-Keynes  (WK)  triangle”  can  be 
described by the key words “intertemporal coordination”, “imperfect capital markets” and 
“wrong interest rates”.  
   Do the differences between the two triangles matter? Is there anything we can still 
learn form the WK triangle which is not in the NNS triangle? The standard answer is that 
macroeconomics, in the days of Wicksell and Keynes, lacked “conceptual rigour” in two 
regards.  Fluctuations  of  output  and  price  levels  were  not  fully  modelled  in  terms  of 
optimizing behaviour, and the “imperfections” that explain them were not well understood 
(e.g., Blanchard. 2000, p. 1385-88; Woodford, 2000; 2003a, p. 5-6). The NNS is believed to 
have  overcome  these  shortcomings  by  integrating  price-setting  behaviour  into  a  DSGE 
framework.  Woodford’s  insistence  that  the  key  results  of  Wicksellian  theory  can  be 
replicated  in  DSGE  models  (Woodford,  2003a;  2006,  p.  196-97)  suggests  that  the 
differences between the two triangles do not matter substantially, so that the older triangle 
could safely be left to historians. 
                                                 
2 In Wicksell’s bank-centred credit economy, it is the bank’s lack of information about the full-employment-
equilibrium,  or  “natural”,  rate  of  interest  that  causes  the  misalignments  of  the  market  rate.  In  Keynes’s 
monetary economy, it is the liquidity preference of wealth holders in view of uncertainty about returns to 
investments that drives a wedge between the two rates. While Keynes had made use of Wicksell’s natural-rate 
concept in his Treatise (1930), he criticized it in the General Theory (1936, p. 183, 242-44) for its underlying 
loanable-funds  view,  but  retained  the  reference  to  a  benchmark  rate  that  would  be  compatible  with  full 
employment. His shift towards liquidity-preference theory has led Leijonhufvud (1981) to argue that Keynes 
lost his “Wicksell Connection” when writing the General Theory. However, in the wider sense of coordination 
failures of the interest-rate mechanism, Leijonhufvud draws a dividing line between Wicksell and Keynes on 
the one hand, and the Keynesians of the old Neoclassical Synthesis whose explanations of macroeconomic 
fluctuations revolve around price and wage rigidities, on the other. Here we follow the same line with regard 
to the New Keynesians in the NNS.   
3 Wicksell (1898a) restricted his analysis of the cumulative process to changes in the price level, whereas 
Keynes (1936) discussed cumulative changes of output, though neither of them denied that these processes 
involve changes in both output and prices. Lindahl (1931) and Myrdal (1931) analysed combinations of both, 
whereas Hayek (1931) described a change in the structures, not the levels, of prices and production. As we 
shall see, changes in all these dimensions coexist. 
4 For the distinction between individual and market experiments see that other book with “interest and prices” 
in its title: Patinkin (1989, ch.I:4). 4 
The  purpose  of  our  paper  is  to  challenge  this  view.  In  a  more  recent  survey, 
Blanchard  (2008)  discusses  several  points  where  the  standard  NNS  model  should  be 
improved to include a larger array of phenomena and provide better explanations. In this 
perspective, our point is that the boundaries of the NNS triangle hamper progress in dealing 
with relevant issues raised by the older theories. In particular, ignoring saving-investment 
imbalances  seriously  limits  the  explanatory  scope  of  the  NNS.  Not  only  are  these 
phenomena a logical implication of any theory based on the distinction between the market 
real interest rate and the Wicksellian natural rate. It can also be argued that informational 
imperfections in the capital markets and the consequent intertemporal imbalances play a 
major role in processes that generate macroeconomic instability, as testified by  the global 
financial  crisis  that  has  recently  developed  (e.g.  Borio  and  Lowe,  2002,  Leijonhufvud, 
2008).
5  
In the following, we therefore propose a modeling framework that reconstructs, with 
some rigour, the WK triangle. Our model is meant to be authentic, in the sense that it is 
made of components that were available at the times of Wicksell and Keynes, if not used or 
even devised by them. Even though we will provide textual evidence, our rendition is not, 
however, meant to be “true” to these writers in every detail. At the same time, we have 
devised the model to be closely comparable to the standard three-equations model of the 
NNS by means of current modeling techniques. In this way, we highlight what Wicksell and 
Keynes  knew  about  macroeconomics  that  might  still  be  worth  knowing,  even  though 
modern  economists  tend  to  exclude  it  from  their  consensus  view.  We  demonstrate  the 
explanatory  potential  of  a  synthesis  of  Wicksellian  and  Keynesian  ideas that  differs 
substantially from the Neoclassical Synthesis, Old and New.  
  The rest of the paper is organized in three parts. Section 2 provides a brief account of 
the standard NNS model (Woodford, 2003, ch.4) that serves to draw attention to critical 
limitations of the new synthesis. We discuss its effective reduction to the intratemporal 
coordination of aggregate demand and supply, and its specific assumptions about market 
structures that must be inefficient enough to create the relevant output gaps, while excluding 
major  logical  implications  of  interest-rate  misalignments,  namely  the  causes  and 
consequences of a mismatch of intertemporal consumption and production plans. 
  Section 3 introduces the model of an economy in the confines of the WK triangle. 
Prices are flexible, agents have forward-looking expectations, the economy has a nominal 
unit of account, and physical capital is represented by interest-bearing bonds traded in the 
capital market. The central bank is the only policymaker, taking control of the economy’s 
nominal interest rate by trading bonds. Information is imperfect in the sense that no one in 
the market can directly observe the natural rate of interest, the real rate that would equate 
optimal saving and investment. This lack of information is sufficient to generate “interest-
                                                 
5  Saving-investment  imbalances  are  ignored  even  in  the  NNS  model  which  include  fixed  capital  and 
investment (e.g. Woodford, 2003, ch. 5, Casares and McCallum, 2000). One strand of earlier New Keynesian 
literature had set the focus on imperfect information and capital market failures (see, e.g., Greenwald and 
Stiglitz, 1987; Bernanke and Gertler, 1990). To the extent that its results have been incorporated into the NNS, 
they  are  not  connected  with  the  possibility  of  saving-investment  imbalances  and  their  intertemporal 
implications.  The  same  applies  to  NNS  extensions  that  include  imperfect  information  and  investment 
dynamics  (see,  e.g.,  Woodford,  2003a,  ch.  5;  2003b;  Mankiw  and  Reis,  2003).  We  comment  on  these 
extensions below. 5 
rate gaps” and intertemporal coordination failures between saving and investment. 
  The  thrust  of  the  model  is  that  saving-investment  imbalances,  by  way  of  forward-
looking agents’ allocations, generate an intertemporal spillover effect, in that they transmit 
the effects of present interest-rate gaps to present and future output and inflation. As a 
result,  these  variables  diverge  from  their  intertemporal  equilibrium  path,  in  a  way  that 
considerably modifies the dynamic properties of the system with respect to the standard 
NNS framework where this effect is not present. First, output and inflation gaps display the 
autocorrelated dynamic structure that is typically observed in the data, with no addition of 
further  frictions  and  imperfections.  Second,  it  is  shown  that  the  system  displays  three 
distinctive WK features. Given an interest-rate gap, the time paths of prices and output 
evolve as “cumulative processes”, which are the result of the interplay of “deep parameters” 
rather than exogenous factors. The system will return to its intertemporal-equilibrium path 
only when the interest-rate gap is closed and the resulting saving-investment imbalance is 
corrected.  Hence,  price  (or  wage)  stickiness  is  not  the  core  problem,  price  (and  wage) 
flexibility not the general solution. 
  In  section  4  we  focus  on  the  formation  of  inflation  expectations  and  on  their 
implications for the system’s stability as well as monetary policy. Since the model allows us 
to analyse out-of-equilibrium dynamics that are beyond the scope of the NNS triangle, we 
can show how short-run rational expectations (the standard assumption in the NNS world) 
amplify price and output dynamics and tend to destabilize the system, as argued by both 
Wicksell and Keynes. This result provides a consistent foundation for those two ideas of 
Wicksell that have been transplanted into the NNS theory of monetary policy – namely, the 
idea that stability can be preserved by a “nominal anchor” in terms of a stable price level (or 
inflation rate) in which agents have reason to believe, and the idea that, to this effect, the 
nominal interest rate should be raised (lowered) as soon as the rate of inflation increases 
(decreases). In fact, we show that a simple “Wicksellian rule” for monetary policy that 
follows  this  prescription  without  any  other  informational  requirements  may  display 
remarkable out-of-equilibrium virtues of system stabilization. We also demonstrate that, 
based  on  the  theoretical  framework  of  the  WK  triangle,  this  kind  of  rule  has  dynamic 
properties that stand in contrast with the NNS literature. In particular, stability requires that 
the inflation coefficient of the rule should have an upper bound. This implies that the so-
called  Taylor  principle,  which  requires  an  overproportional  interest-rate  reaction  to  the 
inflation gap (e.g. Woodford, 2003a, ch. 3), is not necessary and may well  be conducive to 
instability.  Central  banks  may  thus  face  a  trade-off,  not  between  inflation  and  output 
control, but between “small gaps” and “smooth paths” in the adjustment process. In the final 
section  we  draw  the  conclusions  and point out  in  which directions  theWicksell-Keynes 
triangle may be further explored. 
   
2   The Limitations of the New Neoclassical Synthesis 
 
In this section we sketch the basic model of the NNS in its most influential version, as 
presented by Woodford (2003a), and discuss its analytical limitations to set the stage for the 
subsequent exposition of our alternative WK model.  
 6 
2.1 The core model of the NNS triangle    
The NNS is based on a system of three equations that determines the short-run dynamics of 
output, inflation and interest rates. Confining his version to the study of “small fluctuations 
around a deterministic steady state”, Woodford (2003a, p. 243-47) describes it as a log-
linear approximation of the conditions for intertemporal general equilibrium.   
  The first equation describes aggregate demand and resembles the IS curve of the old 
Neoclassical Synthesis, insofar as it displays a negative relation between current output and 
the  current  (real)  interest  rate.  It  is,  however,  entirely  based  on  the  representative 
household’s  consumption-saving  decision  and  obtained by  log-linearizing  the  first-order 
condition of maximizing utility over time: 
(1)  1 1 ( * ) t t t t t t t x E x i E r + + = - s - p -        
As intertemporal optimization is formulated in terms of deviations from the steady state, xt 
denotes the gap between actual output and the “natural rate of output”, s is the (constant) 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution of aggregate spending, it is the nominal interest rate, 
and  Etpt+1  is  the  rational  expectation  of  the  inflation  rate  conditional  on  information 
available at time t. Finally, r*t is the “natural rate of interest”. This terminology refers to the 
definition of r*t as the value of the market real interest rate, it - Etpt+1, that is consistent 
with the steady state value of the output gap, which is zero. As will be seen, x* = 0 is also 
consistent with zero inflation. By contrast, deviations of the market real interest rate from 
r*t trigger non-zero output and inflation gaps. In other words, the natural rate of interest is 
“just the real rate of interest required to keep aggregate demand equal at all times to the 
natural rate of output” (2003a, p. 248). The “natural rate of output” refers to a “virtual 
equilibrium” with price flexibility, i.e. to the output “one would have if prices and wages 
were not in fact sticky” (2003a, p. 9). 
  The second equation describes aggregate supply by relating the output gap to inflation. 
The AS function is labelled "New Keynesian Phillips curve" (though little reference is made 
to the labour market), since actual inflation is proportional to expected inflation and the 
output gap, 
(2)  1 t t t t E x + p = b p + k  
with b denoting a discount factor, and k a rigidity parameter. In order to introduce nominal 
rigidities, Woodford (2003a, ch. 2) makes the assumption that consumer demand is met by 
the supply of a variety of imperfectly substitutable goods. This allows firms to set prices in 
monopolistic competition, following Dixit-Stiglitz (1977). Imperfect competition does not 
per se imply price rigidities, so it is assumed that prices are set in a staggered fashion. In the 
case of interest-rate shocks (changes in i or r* in equation 1), a significant fraction of firms 
will maximize profits by varying their output rather than prices. The value of the rigidity 
parameter k rises both with a and the strategic complementarity of price-setting decisions, 
such that the output effects of shocks can become large and persistent. 
  The third equation describes the feedback of the interest rate to changes in inflation and 
output gaps, assuming that the central bank controls the representative nominal interest rate. 
Woodford (2003a, p. 245) writes the MP function in terms of a Taylor rule:  7 
(3)  * ( *) ( *) t t t x t i i x x p = +g p - p + g -  
where i*t is an intercept term that corresponds to the nominal value of the natural interest 
rate, r*t + p*, or NAIRI (non-accelerating-inflation rate of interest). The weight factors gp 
and gx describe the intensity of interest-rate reactions to deviations of actual inflation and 
the output gap from their target values. The output target is defined as the steady-state value 
consistent with the inflation target. Using (2), this implies that x* º (1 - b)p*/k, and ensures 
that it = i*t whenever the inflation target p* is achieved. The MP function closes the model, 
permitting the determination of the endogenous variables it, pt, xt.  
  The  IS-AS-MP  framework  can  thus  be  characterized  as  a  synthesis  of  standard 
neoclassical,  Wicksellian  and  Keynesian  ideas.  The  failure  of  the  system  to  converge 
automatically on its natural rates of output and interest is ascribed to nominal rigidities 
outside the capital market, as in the “classically” neoclassical approaches of Cassel (1918) 
and Pigou (1933), or in the old Neoclassical Synthesis à la Modigliani (1944). As in Keynes 
(1936), output adjustments accord with aggregate demand and precede, or even prevent, 
price adjustments, such that the latter do not automatically restore the optimal position of 
the system. As in parts of the Wicksellian literature, the “neutrality of money”
6 is not an 
automatic outcome of market processes, but requires a specific political strategy of interest-
rate feedbacks to changes in the price level and/or output. 
 
2.2 Some implications of the model 
In the following we draw attention to assumptions in the basic “neo-Wicksellian” model, 
and indeed in much of the NNS literature in general, that limit the scope of the analysis of 
output gaps. Here we discuss only those that are most important for the contrast with the 
alternative Wicksell-Keynes model presented in the following section.
7  
  It  should  be  noted  that  the  standard  formulation  of  the  IS  relation  (in  equation  1) 
implies that aggregate demand consists just of consumption. As Woodford (2003a, p. 242) 
points out, the model “abstracts from the effects of variations in private spending (including 
those  classified  as  investment  expenditure  in  the  national  income  accounts)  upon  the 
economy’s productive capacity”, so the model should be interpreted “as if all forms of 
private  expenditure…  were  like  nondurable  consumer  purchases”.
8  Thus  r*t  is  best 
interpreted as  the  representative household’s rate  of  time  preference.  If  the  market  real 
interest rate rises, and if there is no corresponding shift in r*t, current consumption falls in 
                                                 
6 It may be argued that money is not a quantitatively well-defined concept, neither in Woodford (2003a) nor in 
Wicksell (1898a,b); see Laidler (2006). Furthermore, Woodford avoids to refer to the concept of “neutrality of 
money”, while Wicksell confined real effects to the small print. Yet, what is at stake here is the argument that 
monetary policy has the power to change interest rates such that the level and structure of prices will be 
affected. Thus it can produce (or avoid) substantial effects on output and income distribution, as argued, for 
example, by Lindahl (1930), Hayek (1931) and Myrdal (1931). 
7  Other  problematic  assumptions,  especially  those  pertaining  to  the  monetary  foundations  of  Woodford’s 
model, are examined in Boianovsky and Trautwein (2006a). Some of their implications will be discussed in 
sections 4 and 5 below. 
8 Woodford (2003a, ch. 5) extends the basic model to include fixed capital and the effects of the related 
investment dynamics, but the possibility of unplanned saving is excluded by assumption. 8 
favour of increased future consumption. The opposite occurs if r*t rises and is not matched 
by shifts in the market real interest rate.  
  The simplifying exclusion of (net) investment has two implications. First, changes in 
consumption plans translate themselves into one-to-one changes in aggregate demand at 
each  date.  Second,  the  intertemporal  coordination problem between  future consumption 
(saving) and future production (investment), which is the key problem to be solved by the 
interest rate in general equilibrium theory, vanishes. The system is effectively reduced to 
the intratemporal coordination of current aggregate demand and supply in each period, 
essentially (to be) accomplished by the system of spot prices for goods. 
  Woodford (2003a, p. 71 and elsewhere) assumes that “markets must clear at all dates”. 
It should be noted that the NNS uses a deviation from the “standard perfect competition 
model” – contained in the AS function, and not in the IS relation – to provide a mechanism 
that  coordinates  aggregate  demand  and  supply  continuously.  The  key  “imperfection”  is 
monopolistic competition, which in the macroeconomic literature is nowadays treated as a 
standard “source of inefficiency” (cf. Cooper, 2004). Even so this market structure allows 
firms  to determine  supply  and  set  prices  while  consumers  are  always  on  their demand 
curve. In the spirit of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), this is frequently interpreted as a 
resurrection  of  the  Keynesian  message  that  aggregate  output  is  governed  by  aggregate 
demand, at least in the short run. However, if it is not simply postulated that aggregate 
demand always matches aggregate supply, further conditions must be satisfied to ensure 
that state. Thus it must be assumed that the households in the system own the firms, that 
they receive the firms’ profits as part of their income, and that there are no distribution 
effects of output gaps and inflation that could feed back onto the latter. All this is implicit in 
the conventional assumption of the representative household. Finally, the model is based on 
the premise that households and firms have rational expectations of future output gaps and 
inflation.  In  this  setting,  the  optimal  plans  are  self-fulfilling,  at  least  in  the  absence of 
shocks.  Output  gaps  and inflation  have  no influence  on the speed and  extent  to  which 
information is incurred, processed and used for predictions.  Imperfect competition implies 
price-setting  behaviour,  which  helps  to  introduce  nominal  rigidities.  The  latter  do  not 
automatically follow from the model of monopolistic competition. To define “the natural 
rate of output”, Woodford (2003a) actually uses the strong assumption of a monopolistically 
competitive system with flexible prices, in which output growth would not substantially 
differ from that of a perfectly competitive system. This is the fictitious NNS benchmark for 
assessing  the  welfare  losses  that  accrue  from  sticky  prices.  The  existence  of  nominal 
rigidities in the goods markets is, in turn, crucial for generating suboptimal equilibria in the 
NNS  framework.  They  are  introduced  with  reference  to  menu  costs  that  make  profit-
maximizing firms choose between price and output adjustments in response to disturbances 
that affect marginal costs (Woodford 2003a, ch. 3). However, these menu costs and other 
components of the rigidity parameter in equation (3) are exogenously given.  
  The NNS triangle is thus a narrowly confined space, precariously based on specific 
assumptions,  by  which  market  structures  are  postulated  that  must  meet  conflicting 
requirements. On the one hand, they must be inefficient enough to generate the output gaps 
that form the control problem for the social planner, as embodied in (3), the Taylor rule for 
monetary  policy.  On  the  other  hand,  they  must  rule  out  all  the  saving-investment 
imbalances that were at the heart of the distinction between market rates and natural rates of 9 
interest in earlier macroeconomics. If there are financial markets constituted by independent 
borrowers  and  lenders,  the  consequence  of  the market  real  interest  rate  on  loans being 
higher (lower) than the natural rate is that households wish to save more (less), whereas 
firms  wish  to  invest  less  (more).  Neither  side  of  the  market  can  achieve  intertemporal 
equilibrium, and the constraints that follow from the interest-rate gap need to be examined 
as  out-of-equilibrium  dynamics.  This  problem  was  in  the  focus  of  Wicksellian  and 
Keynesian economics in the early 20th Century, whereas it is not contemplated even in the 
models  that  endogenize  investment  into  the  NNS  framework  (such  as  Casares  and 
McCallum, 2000; Woodford 2003a, ch. 5). While the distortionary effects of sticky prices 
are the raison d’être of monetary policy in the NNS, Wicksell (1898a) argued that interest 
rates should be brought under policy control, not because there is a lack of price flexibility 
in the goods markets, but because misalignments of interest rates may force prices to move 
out of equilibrium. Keynes (1936, ch. 19), too, emphasized that there is no automatism, by 
which price and wage adjustments in goods and labour markets could balance the effects of 
a misaligned market rate of interest; he stressed that price flexibility would actually tend to 
make  things  worse.  In  the  following,  we  will  examine  these  issues,  which  cannot  be 
captured  in the confines  of  the  NNS  triangle,  while they  can – with some rigour – be 
explored in the framework of the Wicksell-Keynes triangle. 
 
3   Modelling the Wicksell-Keynes Triangle 
 
In the following we present the basic model of an economy in the WK triangle. As it is 
conceived to highlight the differences between the macroeconomics of saving-investment 
imbalances  and  the  NNS  triangle,  the  model  leaves  the  internal  differences  between 
Wicksell and Keynes in the background. It is Wicksellian in that it retains the assumption of 
a  natural  interest  rate  as  gravitation  centre  of  the  economy,  with  no  consideration  of 
liquidity  preference.  It  is  Keynesian  in  that  real  income  adjustments  occur  as  a  direct 
implication of intertemporal disequilibrium, notwithstanding the flexibility of prices. Apart 
from being based on insights of Wicksell (1898a) and Keynes (1930, 1936), the model 
includes features that were emphasized by other authors in the Wicksellian tradition, such as 
Lindahl (1930), Myrdal (1931) and Lundberg (1930, 1937).  
 
3.1    The basic setup 
The  economy  consist  of  three  competitive  markets  (for  labour,  capital  and output)  and 
rational forward-looking agents. All exchanges  take place in terms of a general unit of 
account of value 1/Pt, where Pt is the general price level. It is assumed that technology and 
consumer preferences take the specific forms, respectively, of a Cobb-Douglas production 
function and a logarithmic utility function. These specific restrictions are not necessary, but 
they are useful to obtain a manageable closed-form solution to the model, and to make it 
comparable to standard modern models.9 
                                                 
9  As  to  the  “authenticity”  of  the  model,  the  use  of  these  “classically  neoclassical”  assumptions  may  be 
surprising,  in  particular  to  those  who  connect  the  ideas  of  Keynes  and  other  “post-Wicksellians”  to  a 
fundamental  critique  of the neoclassical theory  of  income distribution.  It should  be noted,  however, that 10 
  Hence,  aggregate  output  Yt  ,  which  consists  of  a  homogenous  good  that  can  be 
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where Kt is the capital stock available at time t and Lt is the current input of labour. The 
share of output that is transformed into capital at time t becomes operative in the production 
process only in the next period, t+1. Capital is fully depreciated within one period, so that 
(5)  1 ' t t K I + =  
where I't = Kt + It is gross investment including capital replacement and It is net investment.  
  Firms are price takers and seek to maximize their expected stream of profits, given (4) 
and their costs in terms of the income-distribution constraint: 
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where for each period t, wt  is the real wage rate, and Rt º 1 + rt is the real gross return to 
the capital stock purchased at time t-1.  For each period t, firms’ programmes consist of the 
choice labour L*t for current production, and the capital stock K*t+1  for the next one. 
  In the labour market, workers and firms bargain over a real wage before production 
takes  place,  but  labour  contracts  are  in  nominal  terms,  Wt  .  The  nominal  wage  rate  is 
obtained by way of indexation of the negotiated real rate wt* to the expected price level Pe
t, 
where (e) denotes an expectational variable (whose formation will be discussed below). 
Hence, denoting with pt the one-period inflation rate, the nominal wage rate results  Wt = 
w*tPt-1 (1 + p
e
t ). Subsequently, firms choose L*t for production, observing the actual real 
wage rate given by the nominal rate deflated by the actual price level, wt º Wt /Pt or wt = 




Firms can raise funds to invest in the capital stock by selling one-period bonds. By 
analogy with physical capital, they are time-indexed by maturity. Hence Bt+1 (in real terms) 
denotes bonds issued in period t that bear a nominal interest rate it with maturity in t+1. 
Likewise, the real rate of return to capital that firms pay to bond-holders in t is Rt º (1 + 
it-1)/(1 + pt), whereas the rate relevant to investment in t is Rt+1 º (1 + it )/(1 + p
e
t+1). As a 
result, L*t and K*t+1 should satisfy the first order conditions of (6): 
(7)  (1 - a)(Kt /L*t )
a = wt 
(8)  a(L*t / K*t+1 )
1-a  = Rt+1 
Households hold claims to the capital stock and supply their total labour capacity L* 
inelastically, which is normalized to unity.
11 They choose a consumption plan (Ct+s ; s = 0, 1 
                                                                                                                                                     
Wicksell (1901, p. 128) was one of the pioneers of the concept of the Cobb-Douglas production function, 
using it to show that the exhaustion theorem (according to which aggregate output is exactly absorbed by 
aggregate income, if the prices of the production factors accord with their marginal productivity) is valid only 
if returns to scale are constant. That assumption is restrictive, but certainly no bigger “as if” than the NNS 
assumption of an insignificant wedge between total output under imperfect competition with flexible prices 
and its perfect-competition counterpart (see above, section 2.2).   
10 This representation of the labour market is akin to Keynes (1936, ch. 19). 
11 Whether the equilibrium employment is equal to, or less than, the total labour force, or how wages are 11 
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given the constant rate of time preference q > 0,  Q º (1 + q), and the dynamic budget 
constraint: 
(10)  1 t t t t t B H R B C + = + -  
Here  Ht º wtLt is labour income, Bt is the real stock of bonds representing installed capital, 
and the operator Et(.) denotes forward-looking expectations, conditional upon information 
available at time t. Consequently Bt+1 - Bt = St is net saving, expressed as real purchases of 
bonds.   Given their utility function (as in 9), the households’ optimal consumption as of 
time t is expressed as 
(11)  Ct = Et (Ct+1 Q/ Rt+1) 
In order to insulate the macroeconomic effects of interest-rate  gaps, the analysis 
should start at a point in which the economy is in intertemporal general equilibrium (IGE). 




t = pt , yield 
the steady-state solution, where the real return to capital is Rt+1 = Q º R*, so that for all t, 
Ct=C*, and B* =K*, Y* =H* +R*K*. Note that S't = I't = K*, and once account is taken of 
capital  replacement,  net  investment  and  saving  are  nil.
12  Hence  R*  is  also  the  natural 
interest rate that equates optimal saving and investment. 
  What remains to be determined, is the price level and the steady-state inflation rate. As 
is well-known, a competitive general equilibrium model like the present one leaves the price 
level and its changes undetermined. The usual practice has long been to introduce a special 
“monetary  equation”  that  pins  down  the  price  level  corresponding  to  the  general-
equilibrium output level. This is actually the critical point where Wicksell departed from the 
classical tradition of the quantity theory of money and introduced his interest-rate theory of 
inflation. Once the nominal interest rate is in place, the intertemporal general equilibrium 
characterized  above  implies  that    (1+it)  =  R*(1  +  pe  t+1)  should  hold  for  all  t.  This 
relationship is also known as “Fisher equation”, and is in fact plugged into the NNS model 
(equation  1).  Yet,  from  a  Wicksellian  point  of  view,  the  Fisher  equation  presents  two 
problems. First, if it is employed to pin down the nominal interest rate, it still leaves price-
level determination unresolved, and the expected inflation term on the right-hand side is left 
hanging  on  its  own  bootstraps.  Second,  if  expected  inflation  is  to  be  determined  by 
postulating an exogenous nominal interest rate, it should be high as long as the nominal 
interest rate is high relative to the natural rate, and vice versa – in contradiction with the 
conclusions of Wicksell, the NNS and common sense (but argued by McCallum, 1986). The 
Fisher equation holds in intertemporal equilibrium, but in the construction of a consistent 
                                                                                                                                                     
determined, is immaterial here, or as implicit as the labour market is in Woodford’s (2003a) version of the 
NNS. In analogy with the NNS one may allow for some “natural rate of unemployment” that creates a reserve 
capacity of labour. On the implications of this assumption see our discussion of the WK model in section 4 
below. 
12 Abstracting from technical progress or technology shocks, this is a Sidrausky-type steady state, where the 
key variable in the capital market is the rate of intertemporal consumer preferences, Q.   12 
interest-rate theory of the general price level, it cannot be taken to hold continuously. Such 
a theory requires three building blocks: (i) the market determination of the nominal interest 
rate, (ii) the determination of inflation expectations, and (iii) the interaction between the 
two. The whole should be analysed in terms of an intertemporal disequilibrium process, to 
check whether it eventually converges to the Fisher equality, and how much inflation will 
be generated in the process. This was in fact the research agenda of Wicksell and Lindahl. 
  Since this is the most critical nexus in the whole construction, we proceed step by step 
from the simplest hypotheses concerning the determination of the nominal interest-rate and 
of inflation expectations to alternative hypotheses, drawing on Wicksell and the subsequent 
literature. In analogy with Wicksell (1898a) and Lindahl (1930), and (Keynes, 1930; 1936), 
we begin with a simplified monetary system that consists of a central bank, representing the 
system of bank loans and deposits as a whole. In a Keynesian twist of this assumption, the 
central bank seeks to gain control over the nominal interest rate it by buying and selling 
bonds in the open market . Pegging the nominal rate, the central bank is ready to create or 
retire base money (the counterpart of bonds) to the extent that is necessary to clear the 
market.
13 All agents form their expectations of the inflation rate, consider their objective 
functions and constraints, and make their plans accordingly. At this stage, we simply posit 
that  all  agents  believe  in  a  time-invariant  “normal”  rate,  pe
t+1  =  pe
t  =  p*.
14  Finally, 
exchanges occur in all markets, and [Yt, pt] are realized. 
 
3.2  Three-gap analysis 
To  begin  with,  we  examine  the  implications  of  a  gap  arising  between  the  market  real 
interest  rate  and  the  natural  rate  with  respect  to  the  intertemporal  equilibrium  (IGE) 
characterized above. Given p*, a gap between Rt+1 and R* can arise owing to a nominal 
cause, where it is set or changed inconsistently with R*(1 + p*), or to a real cause, where a 
change in R* is not matched by a change in it. Which of the two causes generates the gap is 
immaterial here. The key issue is how the system behaves while Rt+1 ¹ R*. What Wicksell 
and Keynes had in mind is, in modern terminology, “trading at false prices” (which should 
not be confused with quantity rationing). By pegging it, the central bank keeps clearing the 
bond market: As long as Rt+1 > R*, it meets excess saving with extra-sales of bonds; the 
converse applies in the case of Rt+1 < R*. The crucial consequence of this can be expressed 
in the following proposition:  
                                                 
13 Admittedly, this representation can be viewed as a short-cut with respect to the full-blown analysis of the 
banking  sector by  Wicksell. However,  the  key point  remains, as the  central  bank’s  willingness to  create 
(destroy) reserves at the given nominal interest rate corresponds to the aggregate effects of private bank 
lending.   
14 The concept of the “normal” value of a variable was widely used as point of reference expectations by 
Wicksell,  Lindahl,  Keynes  and  pre-Lucasian  economists  in  general.  It  normally  referred  to  the  long-run 
average value observed for the variable in question, expected to prevail in future states of rest of the system. 
For simplicity, this information about inflation is taken here as the pre-determined (possibly zero) value p* If 
it also results to be the steady-state solution for inflation, then p* is also the “long-run” rational expectation of 
the inflation rate.  13 
Proposition 1 Given Rt+1 ¹ R*, although the bond market clears, the ensuing levels of saving 
and   investment are not consistent with the clearing of the goods market, neither in t nor in 
subsequent periods, at the IGE values of output and inflation (see also the appendix). 
The proof of this proposition is a well-known implication of Walras Law, which yields the 
constellations in the goods market that are associated with Rt+1 ¹ R* in the bond market: 
Table 1: Disequilibrium relations 
bond market   (t) 




exc. supply      exc. demand 
  (t +1) 
exc. demand      exc. supply 
 
Consider the typical Wicksellian case Rt+1 < R*.
15 In this case, firms are allowed to invest 
more (adding physical capital to their net worth) than households are actually ready to save 
(adding more bonds to their wealth). The consequence is excess demand in period t  and 
excess supply in t +1, corresponding to a production capacity (due to net investment in t) 
that is not matched by planned consumption (low saving in t). If we abide with the principle 
that  “markets  always  clear”,  we  should  explain  how  these  intra-  and  inter-temporal 
inconsistencies among plans can be brought into equilibrium. 
  The solution lies in the following proposition: 
Proposition  2  Given  Rt+1  ¹  R*  in  any  period  t,  there  exists  one  single  sequence  of 
realizations of output and inflation in t and onwards that clears the goods market (proof in 
Appendix). 
  Considering (P1), such a sequence cannot be identical to the one that would obtain in 
intertemporal  equilibrium,  with  Rt+1  =  R*.  In  fact,  following  Woodford’s  procedure  of 
relating actual output and inflation at each point in time, Yt, pt, to their IGE values, Y*, p*, 
we obtain the following expressions in terms of “gaps” (see Appendix): 
(12)  Y ˆ
t =  ˆ R t+1
-1/(1-a),   Y ˆ
t+1 =  ˆ R t+1
-a/(1-a) 
(13)  ˆ
t P  = Y ˆ
t
a/(1-a),   1 ˆ




t º (Yt /Y*),  ˆ R t+1 º Rt+1 /R*,   ˆ
t P  º (1+pt)/(1+p*) 
  To understand these results consider our previous example, where Rt+1 < R*, i.e. the 
case of excess investment, with the central bank buying extra bonds in the market. This case 
makes households in period t reckon a real value of wealth (bonds) smaller than the value of 
capital the bonds are supposed to represent. The interest-rate gap affects the accounting of 
real resources in the economy, and the economy needs a correction of the intertemporal 
resource distribution. To this effect, output (real incomes accruing to households) should be 
higher  along  the  consumption  path  of  households.  Correspondingly,  in  order  to  induce 
                                                 
15 Keynes was more concerned with the opposite case, but the mechanism is the same. 14 
profit-maximizing firms to increase output with respect to Y*, the inflation rate, too, should 
be (unexpectedly) higher than the normal rate embedded in nominal wage contracts. Note 
that unexpected inflation is an integral part of the process, in the sense that, as long as there 
exist interest-rate gaps, and hence output gaps, the economy must be off whatever inflation 
path  expected  by  agents.  As  a  matter  of  logic  implied  by  the  rational-expectations 
hypothesis, agents form inflation expectations in consistence with their plans. However, as 
these plans are frustrated in the goods market, the related expectations of inflation will be 
falsified. 
 
3.3 A log-linear version 
To facilitate comparison with the NNS, we now present a log-linear version of the previous 
model. Let us consider the relationship between the market real interest rate and the natural 
rate in any period t, and let us begin with the IS function (12). Since the output gaps in t and 
in subsequent periods share the common factor Rt+1/R*, they can also be expressed in a 
single reduced form that, in its log version with Woodford’s notation, yields:
16 
(14)  ˆ y t+1 = r ˆ y t - a(it - p* - r*) 
There is a clear analogy with the IS (equation 1) in the NNS model, but there are substantial 
differences,  too.  Equation  (14)  describes  output  dynamics  off  the  IS  schedule  that 
corresponds  to  the  IGE  in  the  way  explained  above.  Due  to  their  intertemporal  “feed-
forward effect” (which is not captured by the NNS model), interest-rate gaps generate time 
series of output gaps that display (a) dependence on the lagged value of interest-rate gaps, 
and (b) some degree of (spurious) serial correlation or “inertia” measured by parameter r. 
Notably, a dynamic structure like (14)  is consistent with recurrent empirical estimates of IS 
equations, which almost invariably find both (a) and (b) – two features that are not easily 
accommodated in the framework of the NNS.
17  We shall see that this specification entails 
considerable differences also in the dynamic properties of the economy.  
  Let us now turn to the AS function (13) in its straightforward log-version: 
(15)  p ˆ t+1 = β ˆ y t+1 
Again  there  are  analogies,  but  also  important  differences  in  comparison  with  the  NNS 
model. The function describes the price/output dynamics off the AS curve that is associated 
with the IGE, with β = a/(1-a) being the deviation of current from expected inflation that is 
necessary for competitive firms to supply one unit of profit-maximizing output above/below 
potential. Consequently, the key to the inflation gap is the difference between the actual rate 
and its expected value ex ante rather than the rate expected for the future. The flavour of 
(15) may in that sense be more Lucasian than New Keynesian, but it captures the essence of 
                                                 
16 Let  m
t t Z Y ˆ = and  n
t 1 t Z Y ˆ = + . Then it is possible to write  a r
t t 1 t Z Y ˆ Y ˆ = +  for linear combinations of the 
parameters r and a, such that rm +  a = n. 
17  Attempts  to  fix  the problem  usually  amount  to  injecting  additional  “frictions”  into  the  markets,  or  to 
postulating limits to the information-processing capacity of agents. Examples of inertial frictions can be found 
in  Woodford  (2003a,  ch.  5),  and  Aghion  et  al.  (2004,  Part  I).  Informational  imperfections  have  been 
investigated,  e.g.,  by  Mankiw  and  Reis  (2002),  Sims  (2003),  Orphanides  and  Williams  (2006).  The 
consideration of saving-investment imbalances, as in the original Wicksellian macroeconomics, may be seen 
as a more straightforward approach to serial correlation.  15 
Wicksell’s idea of inflation as an expectational disequilibrium phenomenon combined with 
Keynes’s idea of the labour market being affected by the unwarranted coincidence between 
nominal wage contracts and their real value.  
  It is clear that at this point a consistent model calls for additional hypotheses about 
expectation formation and interest-rate determination. Before proceeding to these two steps, 
it is useful to check the dynamic properties of the two-equation system (14)-(15).  
 
3.4 A model check 
Equations (14) and (15) form a first-order difference system in the two gaps [ ˆ y t+1,  p ˆ t+1] 
with exogenous nominal interest and expected inflation. This formulation is sufficient for a 
check of its dynamic properties, compared with Wicksell’s theory of cumulative processes 
of inflation and Keynes’s restatement of that theory in terms of output. 
  To begin with, it is convenient to define the variable i* º r* + p* in the IS function 
(14), the nominal value of the natural interest rate. It corresponds to Wicksell’s “normal rate 
of  interest”  (1898a,  p.  82),  in  modern  parlance:  the  NAIRI,  which  provides  the  IGE 
benchmark for nominal interest, it. Let i ˆ
t = it - i* be the nominal interest-rate gap (exactly 
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For any initial value i ˆ
0 ¹ 0, this possesses the following steady-state solutions: 
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That is to say:  
Proposition 3 A permanent interest-rate gap determines permanent output and inflation 
gaps. Conversely, the output and inflation gaps are nil only if the interest-rate gap is also 
nil (see also Leijonhufvud, 1981, p. 136).  
Proposition 4. If r Î [0, 1], output and inflation converge monotonically to, and remain 
locked   in,  the  values  given  by  (17)  and  (18),  with  both  output  and  inflation  being 
inefficiently high or low, and inconsistent with their IGE expected values. 
  These  two  propositions  capture  the  essence  of  WK  cumulative  processes  as 
disequilibrium phenomena.  
  Consider the typical Wicksellian case where i ˆ
0 < 0 and initial inflation is zero, so that 
p* = 0. Consequently, the price level is set on the path given by (18), growing indefinitely 
at a constant rate. In the Wicksellian literature, cumulative processes are, however, often 
associated with non-monotonic, accelerating inflation rates
18. Our assumption that inflation 
                                                 
18 Wicksell (1922, p. XII n.1) explained this as part of the mechanism of expectations formation: “[A]s long as 16 
expectations are held constant at p* = 0 corresponds to a stage that Wicksell describes as a 
relatively favourable situation where expectations remain anchored to the “normal” price 
level,   and changes are deemed temporary. However, as long as the interest-rate gap is not 
closed, changes in the price level persist. This raises the questions of how expectations are 
revised, and how the revision mechanism impinges upon the dynamic process – problems 
that will be reconsidered below. 
  Our model shows that a cumulative process unfolds on the real side of the economy, 
too.  This  illustrates  the  Keynesian  point  that  saving-investment  imbalances  are 
misallocations  that  require  real  resource  adjustments,  irrespective  of  the  degree  of 
flexibility of prices. In a typical Keynesian situation with i ˆ
0 > 0, resulting from a fall in the 
“marginal  efficiency  of  capital”,  equation  (17)  indicates  that  output  will  converge  to  a 
steady state characterized by a permanent gap with respect to the IGE. At that point of 
effective demand, the goods market clears, while the output gap implies unemployment 
above the natural rate (if there is any). 
  It might be argued that our model is not fully true to Wicksell, who envisaged the 
cumulative  process  as  a  mechanism  of  price  adjustments  only,  nor  to  Keynes,  who 
emphasized  that  aggregate  demand  and  aggregate  supply  could  contract  in  a  multiplier 
process at an unchanged price level. However, these mutually exclusive views oversimplify 
the processes driven by saving-investment imbalances in a flex-price economy, as shown by 
our model; and they oversimplify the positions of the two original authors.Wicksell (1898a, 
p. 142-3; 1915, p. 1955) did not deny that cumulative inflation is accompanied by changes 
in output; he just considered them to be non-cumulative and, hence, less relevant.
19 Nor did 
Keynes exclude that the price level changes when the real-income mechanism is at work 
(e.g.,1936, ch. 19). He only pointed out that downward price (and wage) flexibility would 
tend to make things worse and that, on the other hand, price level stability would not be a 
sufficient condition for full-employment equilibrium, at which the money rate of interest 
would accord with the natural rate, or “neutral rate” in Keynes’s diction (1936, p. 243).   
   As a synthesis of Wicksellian and Keynesian ideas the essence of our model is to 
demonstrate that booms and slumps as well as inflation and deflation, are intertemporal 
disequilibrium  phenomena  in  three  distinct,  but  interconnected,  meanings:  (i)  excess 
investment or  saving  is  accommodated  at  the  “wrong”  real  interest  rate,  (ii)  the  goods 
market clears at the “wrong” levels of output and inflation, and (iii) the expected rate of 
inflation is “wrong” with respect to actual inflation.  
 
                                                                                                                                                     
the change in prices … is believed to be temporary, it will in fact remain permanent; as soon as it is considered 
to be permanent, it will become progressive, and when it is eventually seen progressive it will turn into an 
avalanche.” 
19 Wicksell’s theory of the cumulative process is often interpreted in terms of the traditional neoclassical view 
that perfectly competitive markets would keep resources fully employed to the extent that output cannot be 
increased and a low market interest rate could only generate inflation. However, the key to such processes is 
that  firms  are  allowed  to  over-borrow  and  demand  additional  capital.  It  is  only  an  extreme  idea  of  full 
employment that may preclude this demand from being met by mobilizing or relocating resources within the 
economy. This was a major objection that Lindahl, Myrdal and Hayek raised against Wicksell from a multi-
sector general equilibrium point of view (see Boianovsky and Trautwein, 2006a; 2006b).     17 
4  Expectations  and  stabilization  in  the  Wicksell-Keynes 
Triangle 
 
Our  basic  WK  model  warrants  further  exploration  with  regard  to  the  formation  of 
expectations and its consequences for monetary policy. In the basic version we assumed 
exogenous expectations that reflect the “normal” growth rate (zero or positive) of the price 
level. The problem with this assumption is that, in the case of a (persistent) interest-rate gap, 
expectations  of  return  to  normality  will  be  systematically  falsified.  While  modern 
economists tend to rule this out by focusing exclusively on states of the economy in which 
expectations are statistically correct, Wicksell, Keynes and many others in their circles were 
concerned  with  tracking  the  economy’s  behaviour  outside  expectational  equilibrium. 
Nevertheless, continuous under- or over-estimation of inflation was deemed an untenable 
assumption even in their times. Wicksell (1915, p. 196; 1922, p. XII) therefore introduced 
the hypothesis of learning in the cumulative process that shifts expectations from static to 
adaptive to forward-looking and eventually “rational” in the sense of self-fulfilling.
20 As we 
cannot go deeper into the literature here, we confine ourselves to examining a noteworthy 
coincidence between the expectation mechanisms considered in the Swedish school and the 
way in which rational expectations are introduced in the standard NNS model.  
 
4.1 The troublesome role of rational expectations 
An analogy between the Swedish school and modern macroeconomics can be stated in 
terms of short-run rational expectations, the (statistically correct) anticipation in period t of 
the one-period inflation rate,  Et(pe
t+1 - pt+1) = 0, which implies pe
t+1 = Etpt+1. Even though 
we  skip  the  learning  process,  we  can  endogenize  expectations  in  a  way  that  Wicksell 
regarded as plausible, but also as worrysome. Unlike the NNS, he was not concerned with 
jumps from one equilibrium to the next, but with the convergence of expectations in a 
disequilibrium process. Therefore, it is useful to re-examine the WK model in the case of an 
economy where a fraction δ of the agents holds short-run rational expectations of inflation, 
Etpt+1, whereas a fraction (1 - δ) sticks to the expectation of  “normal” inflation, p*. To this 
effect, we replace p* in equations (14) and (15) with (δpt+1 + (1 - δ)p*), while maintaining 
that p ˆ t+1 º pt+1 - p*. As a result,  
(19)  ˆ y t+1 = r' ˆ y t - a'i ˆ
t  
(20)  p ˆ t+1 = β' ˆ y t+1 
where  
    a' = a
1-d
1-d(1+ ab)
,  r' = r
1-d
1-d(1+ ab)





The steady-state solution for [ ˆ y t+1, p ˆ t+1] can be restated as follows: 
                                                 
20 Lundberg (1930) actually used the notion of “rational expectations”. Lindahl (1930, p. 147) had it in the 
sense  of  “individual  anticipations  of  coming  price  developments”  that  are  “the  causes  of  the  actual 
developments themselves”. For a modern treatment of the learning process in the cumulative process see 
Howitt (1992). 18 
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Though similar to (14) and (15), these new solutions are ambiguous with regard to their 
sign, magnitude and stability, essentially in connection with parameter δ. In general, we find 
that: 
1.  the  coefficients  of  ˆ y   and  p ˆ   increase  with  d  in  absolute  value;  forward-  looking 
expectations amplify the deviation of the steady state from the IGE path, 
2.  for  ˆ y   and  p ˆ   to  maintain  the  normal  negative  relationship  with  i ˆ
0,  δ  should  be 





<1; a higher share of forward-looking expectations would 
invert the relationship between interest-rate gap, output gap and inflation gap (e.g., a 
positive interest-rate gap would raise inflation permanently), 
3.   if δ satisfies the sign condition, the system converges monotonically to [ ˆ y ,  p ˆ ]; if  δ 
 exceeds the sign condition, the system may take different trajectories (all with positive 
signs with respect to i ˆ
0), some of which may be explosive, 
4.  the limit solution for δ ® 1, is [ ˆ y , p ˆ ] = [0, i ˆ
0]; in this case, the system “jumps” to   an 
inflation gap equal to (and of the same sign of) the interest-rate gap, and   forward-
looking expectations are (self-)fulfilling. 
  These  results  illustrate  the  troublesome  role  of  “smart”  short-run  expectations  in 
cumulative processes in the traditions of Wicksell and Keynes. The problems arise in the IS 
function. Suppose again that i ˆ
0 < 0, with the negative interest rate gap producing a positive 
output  gap.  As  some  agents  anticipate  higher  inflation,  the  market  real  interest  rate  is 
reduced further, increasing the gaps, and so on. This “expectation multiplier” explains why 
short-run rational expectations are deviation-amplifying and why the cumulative process is 
bounded only if their weight is limited.  
  Recalling  the  discussion  in  section  3.1,  it  is  worth  stressing  that  the  case  of  δ®1 
replicates the result of McCallum (1986), according to which any pegging of the nominal 
interest rate above or below the natural rate leads to price-level changes that carry the sign 
opposite of what Wicksell predicted. McCallum stressed that this is consistent with the 
Fisher  equation  and  concluded  that  Wicksell’s  theory  does  not  hold  under  rational 
expectations.  However,  starting  from  the  Fisher  equation  as  a  basis  for  expectation 
formation, as McCallum does, is not a correct rendition of Wicksell’s theory, in which the 
Fisher equation should be the end point of adjustments in a disequilibrium process. As can 
be  seen  from  our  treatment,  McCallum’s  conclusion  is  valid  only  within  the  limits  of 
uniformly held rational expectations (see also Howitt 1992). 
 
4.2   Endogenizing the interest rate and anchoring expectations 
In view of the processes driven by saving-investment imbalances, Wicksell and Keynes 19 
raised  two  crucial  consequential  questions:  How  can  interest-rate  gaps  be  closed?  Can 
capital market forces take care of the problem or is a “visible hand” required? It is worth 
comparing answers from the WK triangle with those in the NNS triangle. 
  Wicksell was aware that, in the context of his theory, price-level stability would require 
two conditions to be met: The nominal interest rate must be connected to changes in the 
price level in a stabilizing way, and inflation expectations must be anchored by a norm 
against which price movements can be gauged. Wicksell (1898a, ch. 11) interpreted the 
natural rate of interest, not as a variable that can be observed by anyone in the system, but 
as  a  hidden  attractor  of  the  system,  where  the  latter  is  driven  by  agents  reacting  to 
observable market signals.
21 Explaining the observable co-movement of prices and interest 
rates,
22  as  a  first  approximation,  Wicksell  (1898a,  p.  113-18)  argued  that  cumulative 
processes might be self-correcting, provided that commercial banks react to accelerating 
inflation by adjusting their lending rates to a level consistent with the (new) steady-state 
level of prices. This, however, requires that their expectations are anchored to a “normal” 
rate of inflation.
23 Technically speaking, with reference to our WK model, Wicksell’s first 
move consists of endogenizing the nominal interest rate, and hence the interest-rate gap. 
This operation transforms the non-homogenous system (19)-(20) into a homogeneous one, 
where all three gaps appear as endogenous variables. In general, one expects homogenous 
systems to have zero-gap solutions in the final steady state, which we are looking for. These 
solutions should include the “normal” inflation rate. In modern terminology, the aim is to 
define an “interest rate rule” that supports a determinate rational-expectations equilibrium. 
To  address  this  issue,  we  may  begin  with  a  simple  representation  of  an  indexation 
mechanism, such as the following: 
(23)  it+1 = it + g(pt+1 - pe
t+1) 
  Starting from it , the interest rate will remain constant as long as inflation is in line with 
the expected rate, whereas it will increase (decrease) as inflation accelerates (decelerates). 
In a Wicksellian perspective, equation (23) can be interpreted as shorthand either for the 
price-level  correlation  of  the  interest  rate  in  the  market  process,  or  for  the  policy 
prescription that can be found in Wicksell’s following formulation of a simple interest-rate 
rule:  
So long as prices remain unaltered, the [central] bank’s rate of interest is to remain 
unaltered. If prices rise, the interest rate is to be raised, and if prices fall, the rate of 
interest is to be lowered; and the rate of interest is henceforth to be maintained at the 
new level, until a further movement of prices calls for a change in one direction or the 
other.” (Wicksell, 1898b, p. 102) 
  The  key  difference  between  such  a  strategy  of  monetary  policy  and  market-based 
interest-rate determination can only lie in the specification of inflation expectations. It is 
obvious that the interest-rate mechanism of equation (23) is not sufficient to obtain the 
homogenous transformation as long as pe
t+1 ≠ p*. Yet this is precisely the problem with 
                                                 
21 We owe this point to Axel Leijonhufvud. 
22 This phenomenon was later described as “Gibson paradox” by Keynes (1930, p. II: 198-208). 
23 Note that, apart from the central bank, there are no forces in the NNS model that would make the interest 
rate change with inflation.  20 
unregulated market processes examined in the previous paragraph. Hence, there is a clear 
role for the coordination of inflation expectations through an interest-rate rule for monetary 
policy. This can be derived as follows: 
(24)  it+1 = it + g(pt+1 - p*) 
Subtracting the (constant) NAIRI i* from both sides of equation (24), we have  
(25)  i ˆ
t+1 = i ˆ
t + gp ˆ t+1 
Equations (19), (20) and (25) form the homogeneous system in the three gaps [ ˆ y t+1,  p ˆ t+1, 
i ˆ
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  Clearly,  this  system  admits  of  a  zero-gap  steady-state  solution.  Thus  our  model 
demonstrates  a  point  argued  by  Wicksell  (1898a,  1915)  and  even  more  forcefully  by 
Lindahl (1930): The central bank must announce an inflation norm, say p*, and then gear 
the  interest  rate  appropriately,  in  order  to  provide  an  anchor  for  long-run  rational 
expectations, by which the system is stabilized.  
  Equation (25) can be regarded as a prototype of modern inflation targeting that we may 
call the Wicksellian rule, and it accords well with the NNS view of the central bank as 
“manager of expectations” (Woodford 2003a, p. 15). However, the theoretical foundations 
of  this consensus are substantially different and, as will be shown in the following, they 
yield strongly different conclusions for the design of monetary policy  . 
  It  might  be  objected  that  Keynes  (1936)  put  forward  an  alternative  explanation  of 
interest-rate gaps (liquidity preference), an alternative mechanism of endogenous interest-
rate adjustments (real balance effects) and an alternative view of monetary policy (quantity 
control of money supply). He also attached more importance to bond price expectations 
than to goods price expectations. These differences are important, as real balance effects 
and quantitative control came to predominate in the theory of monetary policy throughout 
most of the 20th century. However, seen from the vantage point of the WK triangle, there 
are substantial analogies as Keynes, like Wicksell, concluded that interest-rate gaps should 
not be left to unfettered market forces. He only used different ingredients to pursue the same 
“modelling  strategy”  as  Wicksell,  namely  endogenizing  the  interest  rate  by  way  of 
monetary policy in order to realign the nominal interest rate to the rate that ensures saving-
investment equilibrium at full employment24. Since our purpose here is to compare the WK 
model with the NNS model, we now concentrate on our Wicksellian interest-rate rule . 
 
4.3 Exploring the Wicksellian rule 
An endogenous interest-rate is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for convergence to 
the zero-gap state. It is convenient to note that system (26) can be reduced to the variables 
                                                 
24 As shown by Tamborini (2006), there are in fact remarkable analogies between system (26) and a system in 
which the nominal interest rate is governed by a Keynesian LM function. 21 
[ ˆ y t+1, i ˆ
t+1] since the path of  p ˆ t+1 is fully determined by them. With this specification, the 
system presents two eigenvalues; convergence and stability require them to lie within the 
unit circle. Next, a simple boundedness condition on g is obtained. 
Proposition  5  An  endogenous  interest  rate  indexed  to  the  inflation-rate  gap  ensures 
convergence   and  stability  with  respect  to  the  zero-gap  steady  state  provided  that  the 







This proposition is obtained by applying the Schur Principle to the coefficient matrix of the 
relevant specification of system (26).
25 It has some interesting implications. 
  The first implication is that the Wicksellian rule need not – and should not – specify 
reactions  to  both  output  and  inflation  gaps,  since  the  two  are  positively  correlated. 
Stabilizing  inflation  also  stabilizes  output,  and  vice  versa.  As  we  shall  see,  the  crucial 
concern for monetary policy is not a trade-off between inflation and output, but the speed 
and amplitude of the adjustment process driven by the interest-rate policy. 
  The second implication of (P5) is a contrast between the boundedness on g and the 
“Taylor principle”, which prescribes an inflation coefficient with a lower bound equal to 1 
(see, e.g., Woodford, 2003, p. 253-54). The upper bound on g is the more binding, the more 
inflation is sensitive to interest-rate gaps (as measured by α′β′), and the more short-term 
inflation  is  anticipated  (as  measured  by  δ).  The  contrast  between  (P5)  and  the  Taylor 
principle arises from the differences in the microfoundations underlying the IS relation. We 
have seen that, in the out-of-equilibrium dynamics, interest-rate gaps affect present and 
future output and inflation gaps. As a consequence, gentle, rather than aggressive, interest-
rate corrections are required. A large coefficient may produce faster adjustment, but tends to 
destabilize the system by overshooting reactions.  
  Our model thus suggests that compelling requirements of convergence and stability are 
overlooked in much of the current literature on rules for monetary policy. Special attention 
should be paid to parameters g and δ, because of the deviation-amplifying role that short-run 
expectations play in the WK model. To appreciate this, it should be noted that the stability 
region  of  (P5)  features  two  different  regimes:  monotonic  convergence  for  g  <  (1  - 
Ör')2/a'b', and damped oscillations otherwise. Consider the following example, where a = 
0.4 and r = 0.3 are taken as primitive (realistic) values, which generate a = 0.17 and b = 
0.67. Choosing g = 1 as benchmark value, we would have monotonic convergence, if d = 0, 
whereas  d = 0.7 would  generate damped oscillations.
26 As d approaches 1, the g upper 
bound approaches 0 and then becomes negative. That is to say, the system oscillates and 
becomes unstable even for small values of g (unless the sign of the rule is inverted, lowering 
the interest rate when inflation is low, and vice versa). The search for inbuilt oscillations 
engaged early mathematizers of Wicksellian and Keynesian ideas under the presumption 
that  business  cycle  theory  ought  to  be  able  to  reproduce  cycles  endogenously.  That 
                                                 
25 If A is the matrix, then, 1 + tr(A) + det(A) > 0, 1 -tr(A) + det(A) > 0, 1 - det(A) >  0. 
26  For d = 0, the system starts oscillating for g > 1.83, becoming unstable for g > 23.3. For d = 0.7, the system 
starts oscillating for g > 0.23 and becomes unstable for g > 5.6. 22 
requirement  has  been  dropped  with  the  advent  of  modern  DSGE  methodology,  which 
contents itself with ad-hoc calibration of stochastic processes of exogenous shocks. 
   Finally,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  Wicksellian  rule  is  “robust”  in  the  sense  of 
Orphanides and Williams (2002). Our model shows that, contrary to standard formulations 
of  Taylor rules in the NNS literature, stabilization through the Wicksellian rule does not 
require direct information about the natural rates of interest or output. This is essential, as 
the unavailability of such information is a key hypothesis in the Wicksell-Keynes triangle. 
Our  results  also  accord  well  with  a  growing  literature  that  questions  the  hypothesis  of 
timely and precise information about the natural rates in the NNS.
27 Like the “difference 
rules” discussed by Orphanides and Williams (2006), the Wicksellian rule of equation (25) 
belongs  to  the  class  of  adaptive  rules  that,  using  step-by-step  adjustments  in  view  of 
observable changes in the economy, may drive the latter back to intertemporal equilibrium.  
   
5  Conclusions 
 
Answering  the  question,  what  Wicksell  and  Keynes  knew  about  macroeconomics  that 
modern economists fail to consider, we may now say “a lot”. Attempting to capture some of 
their  central  insights  our  model  shows  that  the  macroeconomics  of  saving-investment 
imbalances, which dominated business-cycle theory in the first half of the 20th century, is 
not  just  a  collection  of  pre-scientific  insights.  Its  essential  ingredients  are  amenable  to 
rigorous  treatment  according  to  modern  standards,  with  minimal  deviations  from  the 
standard perfect competition model. Essentially all that is required is that the natural rate of 
interest should be volatile, and that it should not be easily transmitted to the capital market. 
Recent history testifies that these two conditions are sufficiently common and recurrent as 
to make saving-investment imbalances worth of being brought back to the forefront. 
  Contrasting the NNS triangle of intertemporal optimization, imperfect competition and 
sticky prices with the WK model – defined by the triangle of intertemporal coordination, 
imperfect capital markets and wrong interest rates –, we have found that, even though the 
two structures can be made to look similar, they lead to strongly different conclusions about 
the dynamic properties of systems in which interest-rate gaps occur. We believe that our 
conclusions provide an interesting basis for extending the scope of analysis of business 
cycles and of the role of monetary policy. The two triangles may converge towards the view 
that interest-rate rules are a crucial means to ensure stability. Yet it is obvious that the 
design of such rules requires further exploration, once it is accepted that the central bank 
may be  misinformed about the natural  interest rate,  and that the dynamic  properties of 
processes with saving-investment imbalances differ from those of the DSGE models (see 
e.g. Tamborini, 2008).  
  A critical issue, highlighted by our WK model through the interaction of parameters δ 
and  γ,  is the distribution of “short-term”  and  “long-term” inflation  expectations and  its 
possible endogenous changes – an interaction that gives rise to rich and complex dynamic 
processes. Another issue to be addressed is the effect that saving-investment imbalances 
may have on the capital stock and, hence, the further evolution of the economy. Once the 
                                                 
27 See, e.g., Orphanides and Williams (2002; 2006), Primiceri (2006) and Tamborini (2008). 23 
additional  capital  is  in  place  (or  once  a  part  of  the  previously  optimal  capital  stock  is 
scrapped), the economy can actually produce more (or less), slowing down (pushing up) 
inflation – regardless of whether this was the result of a wrong interest-rate signal or not. 
This phenomenon, which can be roughly described as aggregate demand and aggregate 
supply “moving together” (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1987), is only marginally touched upon 
in the NNS literature (e.g. in Wooford, 2003, ch. 5). Further extensions of the WK model 
should  involve  a  more  explicit  treatment  of  financial  structures,  asset  prices  and  their 
relations to the concept of the natural rate of interest. Given the analytical restrictions of the 
NNS triangle in all these respects, the scope of modelling in the spirit of Wicksell and 
Keynes merits further exploration. 
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A.1 Interest-rate gaps and output gaps 
Based on the model (4)-(11) in the text, we examine the allocations that result if, starting in 
the steady state, the market real interest rate at time t, Rt+1, differs from the natural rate R*. 
Both rates are assumed to remain constant thereafter.  
  To begin with, recall that the steady state is characterized by L* º 1 (fully employed 26 




t  =  p*  (constant  expected or  "normal"  inflation  rate),    Q  =  R* 
(households' time discount factor equal to the gross real return to capital, or natural rate of 
interest), C* (constant consumption), B* =K* (constant real stock of bonds representative of 
capital stock),  Y* =H* + R*K*  (households' real income, given by labour, H*, and capital, 
R*K*, incomes). Note that, as a consequence, S't = I't = K*, and once account is taken of 
capital replacement, net investment and saving are equal and nil. 
  Turning now to a period t in which, cet. par., Rt+1 ¹ R*, let us first examine households' 
optimal consumption path (see equation 11): 
(A1)  Ct = Et (Ct+1 R*/ Rt+1) 
Hence, with respect to the steady state, Rt+1 ¹ R* shifts consumption to the present (if  Rt+1 
< R*) or to the future ( if Rt+1 > R*). Parallelly, households demand less or more (real) 
bonds, respectively 
  Now let us see optimal investment of firms. This is (see equation (8)): 
(A2)  I 't = Kt+1 = (a/Rt+1)1/1-a 
Hence, for Rt+1 ¹ R* investment is larger (if  Rt+1 < R*) or smaller (if  Rt+1 > R*). Firms 
supply more (real) bonds in the forme case, less in the latter.  
  As long as the central bank pegs Rt+1 ¹ R*, it should stand ready to clear the excees 
supply of bonds (if Rt+1 < R*) or the excess demand of bonds (if  Rt+1 > R*), allowing 
households  and  firms  to  finance  their  respective  consumption  and  investment  plans. 
However, these plans are not mutually consistent in the goods market. In fact,  
￿ if Rt+1 > R*, consumption is shifted from t to t+1, while investment in t, and the capital 
stock available in t+1, are reduced. There is excess supply in t and excess demand in t+1, 
￿ if Rt+1 < R*,  the excesses are reversed. 
  How can these inconsistent plans be transformed into mutually consistent demand and 
supply of  output? To  address this point, we follow the same  procedure as  in  the  NNS 
model, plugging the budget constraint period by period(see equation (10)) into households’ 
Euler equation: 
(A3)  (Ht + R*K* - Bt+1) = Et[(Ht+1 + Rt+1Bt+1 - Bt+2 ) R*/ Rt+1] 
The saving-investment inconsistency leads to Bt+s ¹ Kt+s, s = 1, ..., where the real value of 
the stock of bonds purchased by households differs from the actual stock of capital goods 
purchased by firms at each point in time. This results in wrong resource accounting. As long 
as Rt+1 ¹ R*, the actual consumption path consistent with Bt+s = Kt+s should satisfy: 
(A4)  (Yt - Kt+1) = (Yt+1 - Kt+2 )R*/ Rt+1 
where  Yt  =  Ht  +  R*K*,  Yt+1  =  Ht+1  +  Rt+1Kt+1.  This  reformulation  of  households’ 
consumption path leads to the following implications: 
1.  Given  the  capital  stock  chosen  by  firms  for  Rt+1  ¹  R*,  there  exists  a  unique 
intertemporal vector of output realizations associated with consistent ex-post   output 
market clearing. 
2.  These  output  realizations  correspond  to  non-zero  gaps  with  respect  to  the  level  of 
“potential output” given by the capital stock that would obtain with the natural rate of 27 
interest R*. 
  The proof goes as follows. First, for Rt+1 constant, Kt+2 = Kt+1. Hence, (A5) can be 
rewritten as: 
    Yt = Yt+1R*/ Rt+1 + Kt+1(1 - R*/ Rt+1) 
Now divide both sides by Y* to obtain the intertemporal relationship between output gaps: 
    ˆ Y t =  ˆ Y t+1R*/ Rt+1 + (Kt+1/Y*)(1 - R*/ Rt+1) 
Upon recollecting the following relationships 
    Yt+1 = Ka
 t+1,  Kt+1 = (a/Rt+1)1/(1-a),  Y* = K*a,  K* = (a/R*)1/(1-a) 
the two output gaps result: 
(A5)  ˆ Y t+1 = (R*/ Rt+1)a/(1-a) 
(A6)  ˆ Y t » (R*/ Rt+1)1/(1-a) 
where the approximation concerns the multiplicative term (1-a (1/Rt+1-1/R*)) which, for 
sufficiently small rates, is close to 1. (A5) and (A6) show that the main implication of  the 
market real interest rate being set above (below) the natural rate is a sequence of negative 
(positive) output gaps each depending on the current interest-rate gap (R*/Rt+1).  
 
A.2 Inflation gaps 
As to price determination in relation to output gaps, given the general-equilibrium real wage 
rate w* (see equation 7), and capital stock K* (see equation 8), potential output at any time t 
can also be expressed as 
(A7)  Y* = K*((1-a)/w*) 1-a/a 
  Since the nominal wage rate for t is given by Wt = w*Pt-1(1 + p*), firms can adjust 
output for t by choosing the labour input upon observing the current real wage rate wt º 
Wt/Pt .  As a result, 
(A8) 









- + p -   =   + p  
 
  Cet. par., profit-maximizing firms are ready to expand (contract) output as long as pt, 
being  greater  (smaller)  than  p*,  increases  (reduces)  the  current  nominal  value  of  the 
marginal product of labour vis-à-vis Wt. Conversely, we can derive the Marshallian supply 
curve of firms, that is, the inflation gap  ˆ
t P º (1 + pt)/(1 + p*) which supports a given output 
gap. Dividing (A8) by (A7) we obtain 
(A9)  ˆ
t P  = (Y ˆ
t)a/1-a  
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